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The Russo-Japanese War
Origins and Implications

Benjamin Mainardi

The 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War was the first major conflict of the twentieth century and a turning point in
the balance of power in East Asia. In the short term, Russia’s defeat helped precipitate the 1905 Russian Revolution
and the 1917 October Revolution. More broadly, the aftermath of the war informed Japan’s imperial ambitions in
Manchuria—the early stages of World War II in Asia during the 1930s—and continuing Russo-Japanese enmity
over Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Island chain. Studying this historical conflict in terms of international relations
provides valuable insights into the nature of the conflict and how the past continues to shape modern geopolitics.
As a case study, the war offers important lessons in the difficulties of sustained power projection and the exigencies
involved in adaptable war planning. Equally important, Russia and Japan’s intractable imperial ambitions coupled
with their failures to credibly communicate resolve serve as a cautionary tale on the consequences of inept
diplomacy.
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Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
European great powers carved out spheres of influence in
East Asia. As available territory became limited, empires
seeking to expand competed against one another. While
contemporaries widely regarded Russia as the dominant
force in East Asia, Japanese power was rapidly growing.
Both powers preyed on the ailing Qing dynasty of China.
Russia steadily eroded Chinese territory in the north while
Japan waged war with China for control of Korea. Sustained
Russian power projection in the East necessitated access
to a warm-water port. This was found at Port Arthur on
the strategic Liaodong Peninsula just north of the Korean
border. By the late 1890s, Russia and Japan were at odds
over territorial ambitions in this region. Russian presence
gradually intensified in Manchuria and began encroaching
on Korea in spite of Korea’s position within Japan’s sphere
of influence.

The resulting contest for
domination of East Asia would
become the first major armed
conflict of the twentieth century.
As this emerging security dilemma began to jeopardize
Japan’s foothold on the Asian mainland, tensions between
Russia and Japan escalated. Unable to reach an agreeable
status quo while neglecting to fully indicate its resolve on
the issue of Korea, Japan prepared for conflict. In February
1904, breaching international etiquette established by
the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Imperial
Japanese Navy launched a surprise strike against the Russian
Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur prior to officially declaring war
(Aldrich 2000). The resulting contest for domination of East
Asia would become the first major armed conflict of the
twentieth century. Examining this archetypal case study in
regional power transition reveals the perils of intractability
and sustained power projection.

Historical Background
Understanding the origins of the Russo-Japanese War first
necessitates an understanding of contemporary East Asian
geopolitics. For nearly three thousand years, various Chinese
imperial dynasties had been the regional superpowers of
East Asia with few peer competitors. Historians largely agree
that this lack of true peer-competition led to military and
industrial stagnation in the later Qing dynasty (Naquin
1987, 219-221). From 1644 to at least 1800, the dynasty
was the unquestioned hegemon of East Asia. Yet by 1800,

Western powers began encroaching on Chinese client-states
and spheres of influence. Portugal had solidified its hold on
the once Chinese-held port city of Macau, and the Dutch
fostered an ever-growing presence in Taiwan and much of
modern Indonesia. Meanwhile, Spain maintained control of
the Philippine Islands, the British presence in India was slowly
permeating throughout Southeast Asia, and friction along
the Chinese northern border with Russia was intensifying
(Zhao 1998, 26). However, the Chinese-led international
order of East and Southeast Asia established by the Tributary
and Guangzhou Systems persisted (Zhao 1998, 25).
Largely dissatisfied with these regional systems in which
the Qing dynasty dominated virtually all political and
economic affairs, European states gradually began to erode
Chinese influence in the region. As such, the power of East
Asia’s traditional hegemony was supplanted throughout the
nineteenth century, rupturing the unipolar order without a
sufficiently powerful state to replace China. Russia and Great
Britain, in particular, heavily shaped the regional dynamics
of East Asia during the late eighteenth century. Frustrated by
an inability to expand in the Balkans, Crimea, or Southwest
Asia in the first half of the eighteenth century, Russia began
to look eastward. It progressively occupied greater portions
of eastern Siberia and northern Mongolia, creating tensions
with China (Malozemoff 1958, 19-23). Great Britain desired
ever-greater trading rights with the Qing dynasty and
eventually exacted its economic ambitions through a series of
conflicts known as the Opium Wars. By 1898, Great Britain,
France, Germany, and Russia all held de facto control over
large portions of the Chinese mainland (MacNair and Lach
1950, 53).
At the same time, Japan was emerging from nearly two
centuries of self-imposed isolation under the recently
overthrown Tokugawa Shogunate. The new Meiji government
recognized that nations not poised for offense were likely to
be dominated by those that were. After observing the gradual
erosion of Chinese territory by the West and being subjected
to unequal trade treaties, the Meiji government’s chief priority
was modernizing Japan’s industry and military. Prior to
1850, however, Japan’s economy was still primarily based on
subsistence agriculture; military technological development
had largely stagnated since the founding of the Tokugawa
regime in 1603 (Tuan-Hwee and Moriguchi 2014, 464).
Extraordinarily, the Meiji government was able to modernize
effectively using Japan’s existing political infrastructure and
posture as a great power. Still, to truly accede to great power
status, Japan needed to expand territorially as the others had.
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Soon after Western powers began forcing Japan to
normalize its foreign relations in 1853, Japanese leaders
sought to expand their fledgling empire. The logical first
step towards expansion onto the Asian mainland was the
takeover of the Korean Peninsula. However, Korea had
traditionally been a Chinese vassal-state, and despite the
Western powers eroding its influence, the Qing dynasty
had been able to maintain effective control. In 1876, Japan
forced the Korean kingdom of Joseon into an unequal
trade treaty in spite of Chinese objections.

This expanding Russian sphere
of influence began to directly
conflict with Japanese interests.
Continued Japanese efforts to assert itself into Korean
politics heightened tensions in Sino-Japanese relations
Yet after China and Japan signed the peace treaty, the
terms were forcibly altered by the Tripartite Intervention
of Russia, Germany, and France, ostensibly to maintain
the stability of East Asia. Russia was the primary agent
behind the intervention; it sought both to assert its own
influence in East Asia and to secure its borders along
Manchuria against the seemingly powerful China, as
evidenced by the construction of the Trans-Siberian
Railway (Malozemoff 1958, 27). Russia particularly
objected to the Japanese acquisition of the harbor city of
Port Arthur since it hoped to establish it as its own warmwater port in the East (Kowner 2006, 375). Japan agreed
to altered terms of peace in the face of the three great
powers, whose combined naval capabilities outmatched
Japan’s.1 The terms imposed by the Tripartite Intervention
prevented Japan from acquiring the Liaodong Peninsula
and Port Arthur in exchange for an additional 30 million
taels of silver to be paid by China. This intervention by
the Russian diplomatic coalition humiliated Japan and
created a deep sense of suspicion towards the Russians.
In turn, Japan began further investing in its machine
industry and military while also signing an alliance with
Great Britain to counterbalance Russia (Burton 1990,
100).
Japanese suspicions were confirmed when Russian forces
occupied Port Arthur and the Liaodong Peninsula in
1898. Following the fortification of Port Arthur, Russia
1 Kowner’s Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War, 375 records the
local naval power disparity during the 1895 intervention as being thirty-eight
allied Russian, French, and German warships with a displacement of 95,000 tons
compared to thirty-one Japanese warships with a displacement of 57,000 tons.
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progressively began encroaching on both China and
Korea, gaining a number of economic concessions. This
expanding Russian sphere of influence began to directly
conflict with Japanese interests. Should Japan not have
contested Russia’s rising power, the island nation itself
would have been cut off from expansion onto the Asian
mainland. As such, Japanese leaders became increasingly
convinced conflict with Russia was necessary (Zhang
1998, 53). Similarly, Russia was apt to resist Japan’s
rising power because reducing efforts to supplant China
as the hegemon of East Asia was counter to its interests
and investment in eastern territories. The breaking point
came when, in spite of their assurances they would not do
so, Russian forces continued to occupy the Chinese region
of Manchuria and initiated the construction of railways
connecting the region to its territory after the suppression
of the Boxer Rebellion in 1901 (Katō 2007, 101).2
Entering negotiations over these actions, Japan sought
to establish a status quo whereby Russia acknowledged
its control of Korea and Japan acknowledged Russian
control of Manchuria. When this proposal was rebuffed,
Japan understood that Russian actions indicated an even
greater desire for eastern territory. Another attempt at
negotiations to demilitarize the area also failed as the
lack of trust between the two states and concern over
the emerging security dilemma thwarted compromise
(Malozemoff 1958, 246). Thus, Japan would need to check
Russian expansion by force if it was to expand.

Capabilities and Strategies
On the eve of war in 1904, there was a great disparity in
potential capabilities between Russia and Japan. The 1904
total population of Russia was roughly 125,000,000 whereas
Japan possessed a population of only 67,273,000 (Keltie
1904, 1022-92; 855-75). This massive population difference
was equally present in military personnel. Pre-war Russian
military strength was approximately 1,160,000 men while
Japanese forces only numbered 218,000 (Sarkees and
Wayman 2010). Furthermore, the Russian navy possessed
sixty-four warships while the Japanese navy only totaled
thirty-four (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). And while Japanese
military expenditures in 1904 far outstripped Russia’s, US
$89.5 million to US $66.9 million (Sarkees and Wayman
2010). Russia exceeded Japan in industrial production.
2 The Boxer Rebellion was a reactionary uprising in Chinese society in the face of
increasing Westernization. Between 1899 and 1901, to expel foreign influence from
China, Boxer rebels and Chinese imperial forces engaged the Eight-Nation Alliance
that included Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia,
and the United States. The conflict resulted in a decisive victory for the colonial
powers, but marked a general decline in direct intervention in China save for Japan,
Russia, and the United States. For more information on the Boxer Rebellion, see
Silbey, The Boxer Rebellion; Esherick, Origins; or Bickers, The Scramble for China.
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Russia produced 2,766,000 tons of iron and steel annually
as of 1904 while Japan produced only 60,000 tons (Sarkees
and Wayman 2010). Overall, the Correlates of War Project
scored Japan’s 1904 composite national capability as 0.0545
and Russia’s as 0.1132 (Sarkees and Wayman 2010).3 This
scoring represents that in 1904, Japan possessed 5.45 percent
of world material capabilities while Russia accounted for
11.32 percent.
While Japan was certainly outmatched by Russian material
capabilities, its greatest advantage was geography. At its
shortest distance from the home island of Kyushu, Japan
was positioned approximately one hundred miles away from
the Korean Peninsula (Cooling 1994, 455). In contrast, the
distance by rail from Moscow to Port Arthur was almost five
thousand miles (Asakawa 1904, 64). Complicating the issue
posed by this vast distance was the fact that the Trans-Siberian
Railway had only one track and was not yet fully completed.
This created an inherent operational disadvantage which was
further compounded by the concentration of Russian ground
forces in Eastern Europe and Southwest Asia. As such, Japan’s
army was able to face Russian forces with relative parity in
numbers. Similarly, almost two-thirds of Russian warships
were located in either the Black Sea or the Baltic Sea. Russia’s
Pacific Fleet was also divided between the recently acquired
Port Arthur and the traditional eastern base of Vladivostok.
Any Russian reinforcements would have to travel by ship
and sail around the Cape of Good Hope, a voyage of several
weeks (Koda 2005, 22). Equally devastating to Russian
field capabilities was the lack of an efficient communication
network that reached East Asia.

This unstable foundation for
military operations represented
a failure in Russia’s grand
strategy.
Military strategist Carl von Clausewitz emphasized the
necessity of focusing on the enemy’s center of gravity (von
Clausewitz [1832] 2004, 687). This was Japan’s second
greatest advantage, as Russia had virtually no capability to
both protect its recent gains in Manchuria and also strike
mainland Japan. Its forces were limited in tactical mobility
and had to maintain a responsive posture to Japanese
movements. Furthermore, since Russia would largely be
3 The Correlates of War Project is an academic effort to analyze and study the
facets of conflict since 1816. Correlates of War datasets incorporate a number of
variables that factor into national military and industrial capabilities using quantitative data. For more information, see correlatesofwar.org.

unable to resupply or communicate with its eastern forces
by land, any concerted campaigns would require substantial
planning. Thus, Japanese war planners were able to exercise
more freedom in the campaigns. What resulted was a
strategy of denial and targeted operations. First, destroying
the Russian Pacific Fleet would cripple Russian mobility
and constrict supply lines (Westwood 1986, 38). Second,
campaigns undertaken with naval superiority in specific zones
of operation would give Japanese land forces the tactical edge
needed to overcome Russian numbers (Westwood 1986, 52).
In contrast, Russia’s eastward expansion severely hampered
its logistical capabilities, since it lacked proper lines of
communication and transportation from the industrial
heartland. Such expansion almost completely drained
Russia’s financial reserves, leaving the country dependent on
borrowing large sums from France and Germany (Hunter
1993, 146).
Overall, this unstable foundation for military operations
represented a failure in Russia’s grand strategy. Conversely,
Japan’s grand strategy was distinctly more calculated.
Japan followed the British example and focused on naval
development, constructing the fourth strongest fleet in the
world by 1902 (Evans and Peattie 2012, 89). As such, Japan
was able to effectively transport forces to the Asian mainland
with greater ease than any other contemporary great power.
Furthermore, Japanese efforts to gain support from foreign
powers in the form of loans would eventually account for
almost 40 percent of its wartime expenditure (Hunter 1993,
151).
In contrast, modern observers generally find Russian
preparations for conflict in the East against Japan surprisingly
lackluster. These plans were predicated on the notion that
Japan would never be the instigating power (Jukes 2002,
18). In fact, Russian Viceroy of the Far Eastern Fleet Admiral
Alekseev expressed an overwhelming confidence in Russian
military dominance declaring in 1903 that “our plan of
operations should be based on the assumption that it is
impossible for our fleet to be beaten, taking into consideration
the present relationship of the two fleets, and that a Japanese
landing is impracticable” (Westwood 1986, 37). Yet such
a cursory look at Russian strategy in the East neglects the
realities of being the world’s largest land power. As Nicholas
Papastratigakis (2011) observed in Russian Imperialism and
Naval Power: Military Strategy and the Build-Up to the RussoJapanese War, the Russian military apparatus faced no less
than three major theaters of operations of which the Pacific
had been deemed the least precarious. The Baltic Sea and the
Black Sea, positioned significantly closer to the capital at St.
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Petersburg and Russia’s industrial heartland, both presented
theaters with greater numbers of rivals that appeared to pose
a more significant threat to Russia’s national security. As a
result, the protection of Russia’s holdings in the East would
rely primarily on defensive naval positioning to prevent
landings close to Port Arthur, forcing the Japanese into a
ground war in which vast territories and superior Russian
numbers could exhaust the small island nation (Patrikeef
and Shukman 2007, 56). Indeed, in his book on the Russian
army prior to and during the war with Japan, Commander
in Chief Aleksey Nikolaevich Kuropatkin noted that the
Japanese navy outnumbered Russian naval strength in the
region, relegating the Far Eastern Fleet to a tool of deterrence
and his ground forces to defensive operations (Kuropatkin
1909, 27). Kuropatkin therefore argued that his elastic line
of defense had allowed troop concentrations to retire when
pressed and nearby garrisons to flank and attack Japanese
forces (Kuropatkin 1909, 28).

Resolution and Aftermath
Successive Japanese victories throughout 1904 shocked the
Russian regime, but Russia was ultimately unwilling to sue
for peace. This unwillingness to accede to proposed Japanese
terms for peace was in large part due to the influence of Tsar
Nicholas II’s concern for prestige, but also because the vast
majority of Russian land forces remained intact (Westwood
1986, 157). Regardless, the war progressively evolved into
a stalemate following the Japanese capture of the Liaodong
Peninsula. Declining offers for an early armistice, Tsar
Nicholas II sent the majority of Russia’s Baltic Fleet eastward
in late 1904 via the Cape of Good Hope. This relief force
was decisively defeated in the 1905 Battle of Tsushima. In
the battle, Russia lost eleven battleships, four cruisers, six
destroyers, and twenty-seven auxiliary ships while Japan
lost only three torpedo boats (Regan 1992, 178). Again, in
spite of severe losses, Tsar Nicholas II wanted to escalate the
conflict, but rising domestic tensions coupled with Russian
revolutionary gains forced him to enter into negotiations in
August of 1905 (Connaughton 1992, 342).4 Concurrently,
Japanese losses on land had been mounting, and leaders
contacted President Theodore Roosevelt to help mediate a
peace agreement (Connaughton 1992, 272). In its entirety,
the Russo-Japanese War lasted from February 8, 1904 to
September 5, 1905. Over the course of nineteen months,
roughly 2.5 million men had been mobilized and upwards
4 Beginning in January of 1905, massed socio-political protests emerged in much
of Russia largely due to severe social and economic inequality as well as a growing
discontent with the Russo-Japanese War. Much of the unrest was suppressed using
military force as typified by “Bloody Sunday,” but the disruptions caused by the
revolution were severe. For more information about the 1905 revolution see Salisbury,
Black Night, White Snow; Ascher, Revolution of 1905; or Surh, 1905 in St. Petersburg.
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of two hundred thousand were killed or wounded in action
(Dumas and Vedel-Peterson 1923, 57-9).

The zero-sum nature of the Treaty
of Portsmouth would perpetuate
strained relations between the
two states.
Even after agreeing to enter into negotiations to end the
conflict, Russia and Japan hotly contested the negotiation
planning in an effort to save some level of prestige (Trani
1969, 62). Delegates on both sides took stark positional
approaches centered around territorial changes. Ultimately,
the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed on September 5, 1905. It
stipulated that Russia must recognize Korea as part of Japan’s
sphere of influence and establish exclusive Japanese control
over Korea (“Text of the Treaty of Portsmouth,” 1905).
Further, Russia was required to withdraw from Manchuria,
cede the southern portion of Sakhalin Island, and transfer
the leasing rights of Port Arthur and the Liaodong Peninsula
to Japan (“Text of the Treaty of Portsmouth,” 1905). Yet
this resolution failed to address the underlying issues of
conflicting Japanese and Russian interests in the region.
Russia had been denied access to a significant warm-water
port and lost control of part of its homeland, the southern
half of Sakhalin Island, which ultimately curtailed eastward
expansion. The zero-sum nature of the Treaty of Portsmouth
would perpetuate strained relations between the two states
that continued through the decline of the Russian Empire in
1917 and into the Soviet period.
Japan’s decisive victory crippled Russian international prestige
and power projection capability. Additionally, the substantial
loss of face by the Russian regime contributed to the rise of the
1905 Russian Revolution and the 1917 October Revolution.
In crippling Russia, whether intentionally or not, Japan
had effectively removed its sole rival in East Asia while also
gaining large portions of territory. Yet victory came at a cost
of a forty-fold increase in the national debt with an annual
interest accounting for roughly a quarter of the Japanese
budget (Oyama and Ogawa 1932, 252). In turn, East Asia’s
new hegemon began developing a regional system of direct
political and economic imperialism that would come to be
known as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Theoretical Explanation
Due to the decline of Chinese power, the East Asian region
lost its hegemony that had guaranteed international stability
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for centuries. The ensuing power vacuum evolved into a semimultipolar system whereby major European states effectively
divided East Asia among themselves. It should be noted that
Britain and Russia were distinctly more able to project power
to the region. However, Britain primarily sought to further
economic ties while Russia sought actual territorial gains and
the assertion of its own rule. By the end of the nineteenth
century, the only two states that possessed significant forces
in the region were Japan and Russia. Despite both actors
cooperating in the suppression of the 1900 Boxer Rebellion
and engaging in some trading enterprises, this dyad was
ultimately unable to establish a status quo suitable to both
parties.
This inability to compromise on delineating spheres of
influence was largely due to the overwhelming expansionary
ambitions of both states. Progressively, Russia attempted to
fill the power vacuum left by China’s decline through a series
of territorial expansions and treaties with the ailing Qing
dynasty. Japan, however, was dissatisfied with the emerging
Russian supremacy in East Asia (Zhao 1998, 52). Yet when
accounting for certain variables, both states had relative
parity in military capabilities. In turn, as Lemke and Werner
(1996) argued in Power Parity, Commitment to Change,
and War, conflict was highly likely as both actors possessed
similar capabilities and competed for the same position in
the regional hierarchy. As such, Japan engaged in conflict
with Russia to challenge Russia’s rise to power in East Asia.
Likewise, Russia was unwilling to yield to Japan’s demands,
as doing so would hamper the ability to impose a system
favorable to its own ambitions.

This inability to compromise
on delineating spheres of
influence was largely due to the
overwhelming expansionary
ambitions of both states.
The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War can be attributed
to the contiguity of competing expansionary ambitions. The
zero-sum game of territorial acquisition was a driving factor
in the outbreak of war. For Russia, expansion in the East,
especially in Manchuria and Korea, offered an unparalleled
economic opportunity (Katō 2007, 101). Russia had largely
been contained in the West by European interventions and
could not allow itself to be closed off in the East as well
(Geyer 1987, 192). Similarly, Japan lacked the prestige and

power of the other great powers due to its recent entrance
onto the world stage and small territorial holdings. As an
island nation, Japan needed to establish a foothold on the
Asian mainland. Yet any expansion or military buildup by
one of these powers inherently required a reciprocal response.

Incomplete information and lack
of compromise prevented the
peaceful resolution of conflict,
making war the rational choice.
The intractability of Russian and Japanese expansionary
ambitions is evidenced by their inability to negotiate.
Japanese leaders sought Russian assurances that they would
not interfere in their de facto control of Korea. Likewise,
Russian leaders wanted Japanese recognition of their
exclusive economic control of Manchuria. What doomed
negotiations was the linkage of Manchuria to Korea. Indeed,
for either state, Manchuria represented potentially massive
economic gains as a populous, resource-rich region (Katō
2007, 101). However, Russia needed to maintain a warmwater harbor at Port Arthur to effectively reap the benefits of
controlling Manchuria. For Japan, Port Arthur represented
a historical grievance against Russia and presented a direct
threat to its control of Korea. Furthermore, the potential
loss of trade with a region as large as Manchuria would be
severely detrimental to the Japanese economy that relied
heavily on trade. Bargaining over these issues was strained
by Russia’s severe underestimation of Japanese capabilities
and overestimation of its own. Indeed, Russian Viceroy of
the Far Eastern Fleet Admiral Alekseev publicly expressed
such ideas (Westwood 1986, 37). Most importantly, Tsar
Nicholas II genuinely believed that Japan would yield in the
face of Russia’s perceived superiority (Jukes 2002, 18). This
misconception regarding Japanese intentions was, in part,
the fault of the Japanese government as it failed to indicate
its resolve to go to war over the question of Korea (Katō
2007, 102). As such, incomplete information and lack of
compromise prevented the peaceful resolution of conflict,
making war the rational choice.

Conclusion

With the effective subversion of its traditional hegemony
throughout the nineteenth century, the East Asian region
quickly devolved into systemic anarchy. Hoping to fill the
void left by China’s weakness, Russia and Japan sought to
expand territorial control in the region. The Russian need for
a warm-water port in the Far East was crucial to establishing a
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strategic base in the region. Likewise, Japan lacked a foothold
on the Asian mainland and needed to secure its sphere of
influence in Korea. Thus, limited options for expansion
placed both actors in opposition to one another’s interests.
Japan’s defeat of Russian forces shocked contemporary
observers and effectively marked its ascension to regional
hegemony over East Asia. This drastic shift in the balance
of power would be a major contributing factor to Japanese
expansion into China and the South Pacific throughout the
next several decades. As a case study in competing ambitions
of great powers, the Russo-Japanese War offers an exemplary
instance of an external security dilemma and regional power
transition.
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